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Starting with George Orwell’s liberal problem of meaning, this article investigates liberalism 
as cultural structure and myth, drawing on the theory of civil sphere by Jeffrey C. Alexander 
and the science fiction novels of Ian M. Banks. Following Alexander, it is argued that liberal 
societies are built around a sacred core described by the cultural structures of the civil sphere, 
which are structures of meaning as well as feeling. Civil discourses and movements in liberal 
(and not so liberal) societies mobilize powerful symbols of the sacred and profane and are 
thus able to inspire an almost religious devotion. The article then continues to explore the 
meaning structure, cultural contradictions and possible future of the liberal order discussing 
Bank’s Culture series. These novels are set in the borderlands of “the Culture”, a galactic civili-
zation and liberal utopia. It is precisely this utopian setting, which allows Banks to probe the 
internal dilemmas of liberalism, for example between pacifism and interventionism, while 
addressing issues of contemporary relevance, such as the liberal problem of meaning, the al-
lure of authoritarianism or the social status of artificial intelligence. With their literary imagi-
nation, science fiction writers construct “a myth of the future” (Banks), which may often 
reflect the myths of their time, but which can also—as in the case of Banks—reflect on those 
myths, their implications and contradictions. Finally, the fictional possibilities of social order 
in science fiction can be a valuable source for our imagination as sociologists contemplating 
the very possibility of social order.
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Introduction
On March 2, 1940, the English (science-fiction) author George Orwell published a re-
markable review of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. In this short piece for The New English Weekly, 
Orwell (1940) not only predicted that “the Russo-German Pact represents no more than 
an alteration of time-table” and that “Russia’s turn will come when England is out of the 
picture”, but also offered a Christological reading of Hitler as an iconic collective repre-
sentation: exhibiting “the face of a man suffering under intolerable wrongs” reproducing 
“the expression of innumerable pictures of Christ crucified”, Hitler stylizes himself as a 
martyr, victim, and “self-sacrificing hero who fights single-handed against impossible 
odds”. Linking suffering to meaning, Orwell (1940) continues to develop a lucid reading 
of the contemporary crisis of liberalism:
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[Hitler] has grasped the falsity of the hedonistic attitude to life. Nearly all western 
thought since the last war, certainly all “progressive” thought, has assumed tacitly 
that human beings desire nothing beyond ease, security and avoidance of pain. In 
such a view of life there is no room, for instance, for patriotism and the military 
virtues. The Socialist who finds his children playing with soldiers is usually upset, 
but he is never able to think of a substitute for the tin soldiers; tin pacifists somehow 
won’t do. Hitler . . . knows that human beings don’t only want comfort, safety, short 
working-hours, hygiene, birth-control and, in general, common sense; they also, 
at least intermittently, want struggle and self-sacrifice, not to mention drums, flags 
and loyalty-parades. . . . Fascism and Nazism are psychologically far sounder than 
any hedonistic conception of life. The same is probably true of Stalin’s militarised 
version of Socialism. All three of the great dictators have enhanced their power by 
imposing intolerable burdens on their peoples. Whereas Socialism, and even capi-
talism in a more grudging way, have said to people “I offer you a good time,’’ Hitler 
has said to them “I offer you struggle, danger and death,” and as a result a whole 
nation flings itself at his feet.
While opposing fascism to capitalism and socialism, Orwell suggests an affinity be-
tween “Stalin’s militarised version of Socialism” and the former. Thus, the “culture war” 
described by Orwell is probably better conceived as a conflict between liberalism (“‘pro-
gressive’ thought”) in its capitalist and socialist variants, and what can be called “con-
servative” thought, authoritarianism, or even totalitarianism—the latter being iconically 
portrayed in Orwell’s famous science fiction novel Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). In his 
review, Orwell criticizes the flawed anthropology of liberalism which disregards the fact 
that humans are driven by meaning, and not by pleasure. Orwell concludes with a warn-
ing to his readers not to underestimate the “emotional appeal” of fascism, but also offers 
hope that after “a few years of slaughter and starvation”, the star of liberalism might rise 
again—at least for some time.
I believe that Orwell’s brief but lucid analysis not only speaks to his time, but may also 
be able to shed some light on the contemporary crisis of liberalism which has been chal-
lenged by authoritarian movements across the globe, not only in Russia and China, but 
also in Europe and the United States. In the 1990s, after the “revolutions” of 1989 and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, many observers predicted a world-wide triumph 
of liberalism, and with it, the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). Since the 2000s, how-
ever, we are witness to a rise of religious fundamentalisms and authoritarian nationalisms 
which oppose the liberal order as hedonistic and decadent, attacking its apparent lack of 
meaning. At the other end of the political spectrum, “progressives” have tried to discredit 
the universalist claims of liberalism, portraying the propagation of liberal values as an 
ill-disguised form of colonialism or even imperialism.
Nowadays, even self-proclaimed liberals do not shy away from calling liberalism “the 
light that failed” (Krastev, Holmes, 2020). This failure is not confined to Eastern Europe 
but also shows in the heartlands of Western liberal democracy. Arguably, liberalism did 
not live up to its core promise of providing the “Greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber” (Orwell, 1940); now, the promise itself seems compromised. Liberal apologists of 
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“the last man” (Fukuyama, 1992) have succumbed to the Nietzschean critics of liberal 
decadence, of a hedonistic and carefree life. The unfounded belief in the “natural” supe-
riority of the liberal order—often equated with free markets and democratic elections, 
the latter conceived in the image of the market in which atomized voters “buy the prod-
uct” that serves their individual interests best—left liberal-democratic societies on shaky 
foundations. Even worse for a supposedly “progressive” movement, liberalism does not 
seem to offer a compelling vision of the future any longer.
The following article addresses the foundations of the liberal order and its possible 
future. My theoretical reference point will be Jeffrey C. Alexander’s work on The Civil 
Sphere (2006). As a cultural sociologist, he is one of a few contemporary authors that 
recognizes the importance of (collective) emotions and (cultural) meanings for liberal-
democratic societies, since not only fascism, but liberalism also has to rely on its “emo-
tional appeal”. According to Alexander, liberalism is not primarily about free markets 
and democratic elections, but about the way a “common good” is culturally constructed 
in public discourses and further implemented by social institutions. 1 In order to thrive, 
a liberal society not only needs to define a collective interest or “common good” tran-
scending the individual interest of its members, it also needs to create symbols and myths 
that facilitate a collective emotional attachment. Indeed, Alexander’s sociological theory 
of liberalism can be described as a liberal myth, a utopian ideal whose closest empirical 
approximations are incomplete and contradictory at best, but an ideal worth fighting for, 
nevertheless. 
The core argument of this article explores liberalism as a literary myth in the Culture 
series of the science-fiction writer Ian M. Banks. Set in the borderlands of the Culture, 
a galactic civilization living a liberal utopia bordering on anarchy, these novels address 
the liberal problem of meaning, the dilemmas of liberalism, as well as the allure of au-
thoritarianism. Under the social and material conditions of the Culture as a post-scarcity 
society whose miraculous technologies have freed humans (and machines) from almost 
any conceivable external constraint, the external contradictions of the civil sphere have 
vanished (along with social divisions based on class, wealth, race, gender, and religion) 
while its internal contradictions have become more pronounced. With his Culture series, 
Banks created the myth of a liberal future that not only brings the possibilities, but also 
the contradictions of liberalism to the fore. The artistic imagination of science-fiction 
writers is a valuable source for us sociologists by not only illuminating the very possibility 
of social order, but also in expanding our own sociological imagination in regard to the 
countless possibilities of (fictive) social orders.
1. It should be noted that Alexander (2006) almost never uses the term “liberalism”, preferring “democra-
cy” and “civil society” instead. Nevertheless, the normativity implied in his concept of a “civil sphere” is decid-
edly liberal and not really compatible with “illiberal” democracies and “reactionary” civil society associations.
RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. 2020. VOL. 19. NO 4 39
Jeffrey C. Alexander: The Civil Sphere and the Myth of Liberalism
Liberal thinkers have seldom addressed the liberal problem of meaning so vividly de-
scribed by Orwell in his review. 2 Is there something that can hold a liberal society to-
gether, aside from hedonistic pleasure-seeking and the pursuit of individual interest? In 
this regard, Alexander’s sociological approach to liberalism is rather exceptional, being 
informed by the “religious”, collective, and cultural understanding of society of the late 
Émile Durkheim (1995/1912), who himself was an engaged liberal intellectual with so-
cialist leanings (cf. 1969/1898). According to Durkheim, liberal societies are never cut 
off from the “sacred”, which he viewed as the source of all powerful meanings and emo-
tions, but in fact cultivate their own symbolism of the sacred, for example, regarding 
the sacredness of “the individual” (1969/1898: 21ff.), or “the principle of free discussion” 
(1995/1912: 215). Likewise, Alexander’s cultural sociology (cf. 2003) provides an intellec-
tual testimony to the power of the sacred in modern societies, which is also true for his 
theory of the “civil sphere” (2006), a sociological reflection on liberalism and democracy 
in which meanings, emotions, and symbols play a central role.
In contrast to other apologists of liberalism praising the virtues of the free market or 
functional differentiation in general, Alexander draws his inspiration mainly from civil 
struggles within Western democracies, (e.g., the civil rights movement) and outside of 
them (e.g., the “revolutions” of 1989), which led to the rise of “civil society” as a key 
concept in public as well as academic discourses. For Alexander (2006), it is precisely 
the existence of a civil society, or the autonomy of a “civil sphere” respectively, that is 
the hallmark of a liberal-democratic society. Civil society and its discourse embody the 
orientation towards a common good deemed indispensable for the proper functioning of 
a liberal order. Civil discourses and movements mobilize powerful symbols of the sacred 
(and profane) and weave modern myths about salvation (and damnation), thus inspiring 
devotion akin to religious movements. Civil actors often engage in righteous acts, mak-
ing sacrifices and taking risks on behalf of others (Tognato et al., 2020). Far from being 
decadent, hedonistic and shallow, flourishing civil societies are rooted in deep cultural 
structures. The “civil sphere” at the center of any liberal-democratic society is foremost 
a “structure of feeling”—shaped by powerful cultural binaries and narratives which link 
actors, relations, and institutions to the sacred and its profane counterpart—with the 
function to promote solidarity among its members. 3
Despite its mythical underpinnings and utopian aspirations, every civil sphere is a 
“real” instantiation and concrete manifestation of ideal liberal principles under specific 
historical circumstances, which inevitably leads to shortcomings and contradictions. In 
its day-to-day business, a civil sphere has to rely on specialized institutions, such as com-
municative institutions like the press and mass media on the one hand, and regulative 
2. John Rawls (1999), for example, simply assumes that his version of utilitarianism is able to provide the 
basis for a liberal order which can be agreed upon between rational individuals (cf. Alexander, 2006: 13–15).
3. Here, the theory of the civil sphere is clearly indebted to Parsons and his conception of “societal com-
munity”, a societal sub-system that facilitates the integration of society via the inclusion of its members as 
citizens.
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institutions like political offices, elections, and the law on the other hand. Often, these in-
stitutions operate under non-civil pressures (e.g., to make profit or secure power), which 
may threaten the autonomy of the civil sphere. Furthermore, there is an inevitable clash 
between the civil sphere and other spheres (such as the market, race, or religion), which 
can lead to civil intrusions and backlash movements (Alexander, 2019). While some con-
tradictions arise due to external constraints, some seem to derive from the internal logic 
of civil discourses themselves because their universal aspirations are always bound to 
particular communities, and in promoting inclusiveness, they unavoidably produce ex-
clusion. 
Alexander’s theory of the civil sphere has to be viewed as part of his broader cultural 
sociology with the self-proclaimed task “to bring the unconscious cultural structures that 
regulate society into the light of the mind” in order “to reveal to men and women the 
myths that think them so that they can make new myths in turn” (2003: 3f.). In some 
sense, Alexander is not just an analyst of cultural structures shaping contemporary po-
litical discourses but he himself became the creator of a cultural sociological myth of 
liberalism whose aim is to empower liberal activists world-wide. It is not only sociologi-
cal theory, but also literature that can become part of the mythical structure of society, 
which accounts for Alexander’s recurring interest in literature in The Civil Sphere (2006), 
not primarily as a mirror of society, but as a cultural force challenging prevailing myths 
and creating new ones. According to the author Banks, science fiction can be described 
as an attempt “to construct a myth of the future” (Branscobe, Banks, 2007). Nevertheless, 
science fiction as a genre, with the possible exception of dystopian works like Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, is often dismissed as adolescent wish-fulfillment and not regarded 
as literature in the proper sense. Furthermore, much of science fiction, once it was no 
longer just about adventure stories in space, has been overly focused on technology and 
the “hard sciences”, which unconsciously tended to reproduce the “myths” and ideologi-
cal presuppositions of their time. In contrast, with his Culture series, Banks created an 
artificial myth that allows us to reflect on the myths of contemporary society, exploring 
their implications and contradictions, and may also help us to shape its future.
Iain M. Banks: The Culture as Myth of a Liberal Future
Iain Menzies Banks was a Scottish novelist (1954–2013) who wrote mainstream fiction 
under the name of Iain Banks, and science fiction as Iain M. Banks. Already in the 1970s, 
he started to work on three science fiction novels, two of which were later published as 
part of his Culture series, but he made his debut with Wasp Factory (1984) and other 
mainstream fiction novels. It was only in 1987, after he had established his reputation 
as a “serious” writer, that he was able to publish his first science fiction novel Consider 
Phlebas, the first of nine Culture novels (plus one novella and a short story). As a novelist, 
Banks not only won critical acclaim—he was listed by The Times in 2008 as one of the 
“50 greatest British writers since 1945” (The Times, 2008)—but also gained considerable 
scholarly attention (e.g., Colebrook, Cox, 2013; Kincaid, 2018). In the following, I will 
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limit my discussion of liberalism in Banks’ work to his Culture series, although many of 
its themes and topics appear in his mainstream novels as well, and vice versa.
If there is something that literary critics and scholars can agree upon, it is the fact that 
Banks’ writing is deeply political, his Culture novels in particular. Banks’ political views 
might be more influential than many people think, 4 but they do not fit easily into estab-
lished categories, and the same can be said of the politics of the Culture. Banks’ science 
fiction utopia has been rightly called liberal, communist, and anarchist, but also wrongly 
described as “monolithic totalitarianism”. 5 While such characterizations often reflect the 
political bias of the reader, I believe that the Culture has to be understood in its own 
terms—or at least in those of Banks.
Critics seem to have a strong inclination to read fantasy novels such as Tolkien’s Lord 
of the Rings or science fiction novels like the Culture series as historical and political alle-
gories. Orwell’s Animal Farm and Nineteen Eighty-Four have both been read allegorically, 
with diverging plausibility. 6 Similarly, many critics and scholars have read Banks’ Culture 
novels—at least in part—as historical-political allegories. Patricia Kerslake, for example, 
identified the Culture with the liberal West, arguing that “the warlike Idirans violently op-
pose the Culture, a position highly reminiscent of the Soviet Union and the United States 
during the Cold War” (2007: 176; also Nussbaum, 2018). Others have likened Banks’ Cul-
ture to the post-Stalinist Soviet Union (Mendlesohn, 2005: 122); more to the point, his 
Scottish colleague Ken MacLeod (2003) argued that Consider Phlebas (1987) has been 
influenced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—favoring the Communist infidels over 
religious fanatics (and thus a critique of Frank Herbert’s Dune). Others have noted influ-
ences and parallels to the Gulf War and the Iraq War (Duggan 2007); Look to Windward 
(2000), which is dedicated to “the Gulf War Veterans”, could even be read as a prophetic 
anticipation of 9/11 (Jones, 2001).
While historical experiences have certainly informed Banks’ Culture series, an alle-
gorical reading does not do it justice. The Culture series does not just offer a mirror 
image of our world and its history but constitutes a universe of its own. In this regard, 
Banks’ Culture series is on par with the world-building of J. R. R. Tolkien in The Lord of 
the Rings, in whose foreword to the second edition we find the following rebuttal of an 
allegorical reading of his work: “. . . I cordially dislike allegory in all its manifestations, 
and always have done so since I grew old and wary enough to detect its presence. I much 
4. The richest man on the planet, Jeff Bezos, described Banks’ Culture series as “a huge personal favorite” 
(February 21, 2018, on Twitter), while the current number two, Elon Musk, called himself “a utopian anarchist 
of the kind best described by Iain Banks” (June 17, 2018, on Twitter), and even named two SpaceX drones after 
spaceships from the Culture series; cf. Stubby the Rocket (2015).
5. Stuart Kelly, thus demonstrating his own flawed understanding of Banks (2018).
6. Animal Farm can and indeed should be read as a parable of the Russian Revolution; the use of animals 
as protagonists is a literary convention that clearly signifies the genre of the fable which can be considered an 
invitation for allegorical readings. An allegorical reading, however, is not warranted in the case of Nineteen 
Eighty-Four, which some (conservative) critics have considered as a political commentary on English post-
war socialism (btw., like “The Scouring of the Shire”, the last chapter of Lord of the Rings). While inspired by 
historical facts, the totalitarian dystopia of Nineteen Eighty-Four has to be regarded as a literary ideal-typical 
construction in its own right—not unlike the Culture novels of Banks.
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prefer history—true or feigned—with its varied applicability to the thought and experi-
ence of readers. I think that many confuse applicability with allegory, but the one resides 
in the freedom of the reader, and the other in the purposed domination of the author” 
(1995/1965: xvii).
The same argument can be applied to Banks’ Culture series, which revolves around 
the liberal struggle of freedom against domination. While some of its themes echo the 
dark sides of human history such as slavery, exploitation, and colonialism, they primarily 
have to be read as part of the universe constructed by Banks. Nevertheless, his writing can 
be applied to historical events, partly because its abstractions and idealizations are rooted 
in historical experience. For example, the resemblance of the plot of Look to Windward 
(2000), in which a suicide bomber attempts to destroy a Culture orbital, to 9/11 and the 
American-led War on Terror is not merely coincidental (as falsely suggested by Kincaid, 
2018); the timing might be, but the issues that are addressed are not. The problem of ter-
rorism and the dilemmas of the liberal response are structurally implied in the concep-
tion of technologically advanced societies and the logic of liberalism. Otherwise, it would 
have been impossible for a sociological thinker like Niklas Luhmann (2008/1993) to dis-
cuss what later would be called the “ticking-bomb scenario”. Like sociological thinking, 
literature allows for abstractions and idealizations that can be applied to historical and 
contemporary events.
So what is the Culture if not simply a historical or political analogy? In an interview 
with Tim Metcalfe in 1989, Banks explained the rationale behind the creation of the Cul-
ture as follows:
I wanted to say, “Look, there is a possibility of something really good in the future. 
Here’s a genuine, humanist, non-superstitious, nonreligious, functioning utopia 
where absolutely no-one is exploited; where they don’t have money, where they 
don’t have laws to speak of, my idea of a perfect society—and it’s obviously not 
capitalist—but it’s so communist it’s beyond anything in a way. Something like the 
Culture could just about evolve from capitalism” (quoted in Martingale, 2013: 441).
Like Orwell, who called himself a socialist but was opposed to Stalin, Banks tran-
scends established political binaries. His Culture series is neither an apology of 20th cen-
tury capitalism or communism but offers an idealized image of a liberal society centered 
on personal freedom and non-exploitation which is projected into the far future. Like 
Orwell in his review (and in Nineteen Eighty-Four, a dystopian image of an illiberal to-
talitarian society), Banks is primarily interested in the contrast between liberal and au-
thoritarian societies. In his first Culture novel, Consider Phlebas (1987), the authoritarian 
faction, the Idirans, are religiously motivated; in subsequent novels, we also find authori-
tarian societies based on capitalism or caste systems. For Banks, it seems, all liberal soci-
eties are alike, converging on an ideal that looks like the Culture, while each authoritarian 
society is repressive and exploitative in its own way.
In comparison to Orwell’s totalitarian dystopia Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), Banks’ 
construction of a liberal utopia faces unique narrative challenges. To tell a captivating 
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story that ultimately matters in a utopian setting is incredibly difficult, so the plot of a 
Culture novel is usually situated at the fringes of the Culture; while it is certainly possible 
to tell a story entirely within the Culture, it would cease to be a story about the Culture 
(cf. Jacobs, 2009). For the same reason, Culture novels are often narrated from the view-
point of outsiders. An example is Horza in Consider Phlebas (1987), who detests the Cul-
ture for being run by machines. In contrast to “authoritarian fiction” (Suleiman, 1983), in 
which outsider protagonists are usually converted into true believers, Banks’ “liberal fic-
tion” refrains from such rhetoric devices, 7 blurring the boundaries and empowering the 
reader instead. While the latter learns to sympathize with Horza, the main protagonist, 
who finds himself collaborating with machines and Culture citizens, is finally betrayed 
by his Idiran allies. Nevertheless, at no point in the story does Horza disavow his beliefs. 
Instead, it is the Culture citizen Balveda who questions her involvement in the “just” 
war against the Idirans in the epilogue of the book. Although consistently portrayed as a 
liberal utopia, the narrative progression in the novels tends to highlight its inner contra-
dictions of the Culture.
It is still possible to read the Culture novels as a political Bildungsroman, as we will 
see later, its most important lesson being the “diabolic” nature of politic: a recognition of 
the fact that bad things can come from good intentions (cf. Weber, 1949). Contrary to the 
assertions of critics (e.g., Kincaid, 2018), Banks never abandoned the Culture as a liberal 
utopia, but purposively choose to play the devil’s advocate: “Right from the start I was 
trying not to proselytise. The Culture’s not perfect, but it’s as close to perfection as you 
can get with anything remotely human (and still probably far better than we can expect)” 
(Branscobe, Banks, 2007). It is this refusal to proselytize which allows Banks to probe the 
inner contradictions of liberalism in his Culture novels. They do not result from “imper-
fections” or “bad” intentions on the side of the Culture, but from the paradoxes built into 
the very foundation of a liberal order. Banks pushes the utopian genre to its limits, relent-
lessly exploring the contradictions and tensions of liberalism. This excerpt from a eulogy 
for Banks sums it up perfectly: “Because the Culture is an abstracted, idealized version of 
our own liberal societies, extrapolated out into a situation in which all problems of mate-
rial scarcity have been solved through automation and machine intelligence on a scale of 
which we can only begin to dream, the dilemmas that the Culture faces are our dilemmas, 
sketched on a fabulous canvas that allows Banks to explore them in ideal-typical purity” 
(Jackson, 2013).
Banks’ Culture novels are not historical-political allegories, but literary thought ex-
periments which dissect contemporary myths of liberalism, probe their far-reaching im-
plications, and offer their own liberal myth of the future. In order to analyze the meaning 
structure and dilemmas of liberalism in Banks’ Culture series, we first need to investigate 
his world-building informed by his own theoretical considerations, which allows him to 
construct the Culture as a plausible, although fictional, embodiment of the liberal order.
7. With the possible exception of Gurgeh in The Player of Games (1989), a dissatisfied Culture citizen who 
comes to terms with his own society at the end of the story after beating the authoritarian Azad at their own 
game.
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The Nomos beyond Earth: The Culture as a Spacefaring and Space-Dwelling 
Civilization
As the name suggests, science fiction as a literary genre has always had an interest in 
scientific theory, especially pertaining to natural sciences such as physics. The proper use 
of scientific theory is still regarded in fan circles as the distinguishing feature between 
“hard” and “soft” science fiction, despite the fact that the binary was originally created 
to single out science fiction which had a focus on human “soft” sciences, such as psy-
chology, anthropology, and sociology (cf. Prucher, 2007: 191). According to both criteria, 
Banks’ Culture series qualifies as “soft” science fiction. Banks’ “liberal” use of science and 
technology does not confine itself to known or even remotely plausible science, featuring 
“impossible” technologies such as faster-than-light travel (and faster-than-light commu-
nications, crucial for a galaxy-spanning civil sphere), and a fantastic speculative cosmol-
ogy (including multiple dimensions and universes as well as spaces between and beyond 
them). At the same time, Banks devoted much of his effort to theorize the mental, social, 
and cultural aspects of space-faring civilizations. In order to outline the social and politi-
cal theory implied in the Culture novels, we will have to discuss the role of (outer) space 
in shaping the form of life and the civil sphere of the Culture. 
Even cultural sociologists who emphasize the autonomy and internal logic of culture 
and society have to concede, at some point, that real societies are partially shaped by 
their history and external circumstances, with civil society being no exception. Talking 
about its contradictions, Alexander comments in a brief section on “The Geography of 
Civil Society” on the territorial aspect of the civil sphere, which “is not just some place, 
or any place, a “center”, a place that is different from places outside this territory” (2006: 
196). Even liberal-democratic societies with universal aspirations have their homeland 
and their own national myths of origin. The spatial instantiation and territorialization of 
the civil sphere gives birth to a multitude of more-or-less civil societies with their own 
laws and conceptions of the sacred.
The thought that political order is always also a spatial order originates in the works of 
Carl Schmitt. In Land and Sea (1997/1942), Schmitt explores the cultural-political differ-
ences between seafaring and land-dwelling civilizations, a dichotomy superseded by the 
discovery and conquest of the third dimension with airplanes. He develops this concep-
tion of a spatial-political order further in the The Nomos of the Earth—the Greek word 
nomos meaning “territory” as well as “law”—investigating the changing spatial-political 
orders in history: “Development of modem technology has robbed the sea of its elemen-
tal character. A new, third dimension—airspace—has become the force-field of human 
power and activity. Today, many believe that the whole world, our planet, is now only a 
landing field or an airport, a storehouse of raw materials, and a mother ship for travel 
in outer space. That certainly is fantastic. But it demonstrates the power with which the 
question of a new nomos of the earth is being posed” (2003/1950: 354).
According to Schmitt, a new nomos of the earth, reflecting the impact of modern 
technology on the spatial order, has yet to arrive. While Schmitt’s last “fantastic” example, 
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that of spaceship Earth, touches upon the possibility of a nomos beyond the earth, he 
treats it as a mere extension of the airspace. Following in the footsteps of Schmitt, other 
authors have shown how the old nomos of earth, characterized by territorialization, is 
challenged by the compression of space via technology and the transgression of territorial 
boundaries in an age of globalization and climate change. Peter Sloterdijk (2015) showed 
how the imagination of the earth has been transformed from an open territory into an 
ever-closer globe, while Bruno Latour (2017) has argued that the climate catastrophe of 
the Anthropocene led to the emergence of a new political conflict between the humans 
and their successors, the “earthbound”. Latour devotes a lot of attention to a paragraph 
towards the end of Schmitt’s foreword to The Nomos of the Earth which is also of eminent 
interest for us:
The traditional Eurocentric order of international law is foundering today, as is the 
old nomos of the earth. This order arose from a legendary and unforeseen discov-
ery of a new world, from an unrepeatable historical event. Only in fantastic paral-
lels can one imagine a modern recurrence, such as men on their way to the moon 
discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and 
utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on earth. The question of a new no-
mos of the earth will not be answered with such fantasies, any more than it will be 
with further scientific discoveries. Human thinking again must be directed to the 
elemental orders of its terrestrial being here and now. We seek to understand the 
normative order of the earth. (Schmitt, 2003/1950: 39)
Schmitt—like Latour—stresses the inescapable character of a terrestrial spatial-polit-
ical order. For Schmitt, the possibility of extraterrestrial colonization is no more than a 
fantasy that entails the mere extension of the old nomos of the Earth into space. Most of 
modern science fiction, indulging in such “fantasies”, seems to support Schmitt’s thesis 
by combing futuristic technologies with star-spanning empires and other neo-feudal ele-
ments (Asimov, Herbert, etc.). There are a few exceptions, notably Banks, who posed the 
question of a nomos beyond Earth, perhaps in the most radical way. According to Banks, 
the vastness and hostility of outer space leads to very different conceptions of the spatial-
political order compared to the ones we know from human history. Humanity, once it 
becomes a spacefaring and space-dwelling civilization, will eventually move beyond the 
nomos of the earth. The Culture exemplifies one possibility for such a nomos of space, as 
explored by Banks in his novels. 
The rationale behind Banks’ world building and his conception of the Culture finds 
its clearest expression in a short online commentary from 1994 titled “A Few Notes on 
the Culture” (Banks, 1994). Here, Basks argues that spacefaring and space-dwelling so-
cieties will develop social and political orders that are radically different from seafaring, 
land-dwelling, or even planet-bound civilizations due to the constraints and affordances 
of their environment: “The Culture, in its history and its on-going form, is an expression 
of the idea that the nature of space itself determines the type of civilisations which will 
thrive there. . . . Essentially, the contention is that our currently dominant power systems 
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cannot long survive in space; beyond a certain technological level a degree of anarchy is 
arguably inevitable and anyway preferable” (Ibid.).
According to Banks, living in space entails self-sufficiency and mobility, which makes 
it almost impossible to control large territories or prevent dissenting groups from break-
ing off. At the same time, the vulnerability of space habitats and ships reinforces the 
dependence of the crew on each other and their technology, which facilitates a strong 
cohesion within groups: “The theory here is that the property and social relations of long-
term space-dwelling (especially over generations) would be of a fundamentally different 
type compared to the norm on a planet; the mutuality of dependence involved in an 
environment which is inherently hostile would necessitate an internal social coherence 
which would contrast with the external casualness typifying the relations between such 
ships/habitats” (Ibid.).
Consequently, the social structure within autonomous groups in space and the social 
relations between such groups will diverge drastically, resulting in what Banks dubs “so-
cialism within, anarchy without”. The Culture is an acephal society, without a center or 
even a territory, composed of autonomous units each representing the Culture as a whole. 
Like the monads of Leibniz, each unit mirrors the Culture in its own way, but without a 
central monad, which is Leibniz’s God. The members of separate groups, usually sharing 
the same space-habitat or spaceship, can move freely between these groups as it suits their 
individual needs and political views, or even defect from the Culture altogether. What 
holds the Culture together is neither domination nor territory, but solidarity facilitated 
by a shared structure of meaning.
According to Banks, the nomos of space, the social-spatial order of a spacefaring and 
space-dwelling civilization, views planets and stars mainly as sources of material and en-
ergy to be exploited for the construction and maintenance of ships and artificial habitats, 
a more efficient and thus superior mode of existence than planet-dwelling, according to 
the Culture. This reductionist view of celestial bodies is counteracted by the Culture’s ap-
preciation of complexity, biological and cultural diversity in particular. “Terraforming” 
is not only rejected as inefficient but also as “ecologically unsound” (Ibid.). Planets are 
treated as nature preserves, something to be visited and studied, not to be colonized and 
exploited. The sheer abundance of material and energy in the galaxy renders the act of 
“land-appropriation” (Schmitt, 2003/1950: 80ff.) superfluous, and the control of vast ter-
ritories unnecessary. 8
The vast majority of the citizens of the Culture lives on artificial habitats and ships. 
The spatial order of the Culture might not have a center in the political sense, but it is 
divided in multiple centers and peripheries in a social sense, mirroring the urban-rural 
divide. As The Player of Games informs us, “the Culture’s real cities were its great ships, 
8. It should be noted that Banks mentions the scarcity of resources and energy as a rationale behind the 
creation of digital afterlives by many galactic civilizations in Surface Detail (2010). However, these limitations 
seem not to apply to the Culture, maybe for technological reasons (the Culture is able to generate energy from 
the fabric of the multiverse itself) or cultural reasons (despite de-facto immortality, either as an organism or in 
digital form, voluntary death is a common practice for the biological members of the Culture).
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the General Systems Vehicles”, sometimes populated by billions of people, “Orbitals were 
its rustic hinterland, where people liked to spread them out with plenty of elbow room” 
(1988: 49). Even the huge orbitals, with a surface area of multiple Earths, are mobile in 
principle, which is not only important in times of armed conflict but gives the entire 
Culture a nomadic character. In contrast to other galactic civilizations, which often revere 
their home planet (or other celestial bodies) as sacred, the Culture—a melting pot of sev-
eral humanoid species—has no home planet and is not attached to any particular place in 
the galaxy (although some of its members might be).
The nomos of space as imagined by Banks highlights some peculiar limitations of the 
terrestrial civil sphere. While the existence of several territorially bound societies and 
states allows for an exit option in principle, there is no such option for the whole Earth as 
a globe. We are earthbound, as Latour says, and, as Schmitt attests, all land on the planet 
has been appropriated and divided politically. People can flee certain territories but there 
is no escape from the logic of territorialization. In contrast, the abundance of resources 
and the vastness of space always allows for exit options encouraging people to form like-
minded communities. While the Culture shares a common structure of meaning, its civil 
sphere is not policed centrally and becomes fuzzy at the edges. Not only is defection a 
possibility, but individual groups may also slowly gravitate away from what most Culture 
citizens deem appropriate, though only in rare cases does this warrant policing or even 
military action on part of the Culture.
The Culture as a Civil Sphere and its Citizens
While its individual constituents may be internally socialist and externally anarchic, the 
Culture as a whole can be described as a civil sphere based on liberal principles, ex-
pression of freedom and absence of exploitation in particular. Nevertheless, this cultural 
structure is also applied to other societies since its principles are regarded to be universal. 
While Banks himself may have tried his best not to proselytize in his novels, the Culture 
itself is portrayed as driven by a missionary zeal to spread its liberal values throughout 
the galaxy. It engages in a civilizing mission, which is precisely the opposite of Star Trek’s 
“prime directive” (based on the principle of non-interference), as many commentators 
have noted. It is the fundamental conflict between liberal and authoritarian values and 
the often-unintended consequences of liberal interventions which drives the plot in all 
Culture novels. Before we address the problem of liberal interventionism, it is necessary 
to provide a brief outline of the Culture as a civil sphere.
According to Alexander (2006), the “inclusion” or “incorporation” of the members 
of a society as “citizens” is one of the most important functions of the civil sphere. Civil 
spheres have to balance “solidarity” and “difference”, social cohesion and cultural di-
versity, the requirements of social order with calls for individual autonomy. Alexander 
suggests there is a tendency in modern liberal societies to shift from assimilation to a 
multi-cultural mode of incorporation (2006: 395–457), which reflects these premises. The 
liberal order stands and falls with the assumption that achieving this balance is not a 
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zero-sum game: we do not lose in solidarity what we gain in recognition of difference; 
cultural diversity is not a threat to social cohesion in itself; and increasing demands for 
individual autonomy can not only be integrated into the social order but can even form 
the basis of such an order.
Being a fusion of several humanoid species, it can be argued that the Culture has in-
clusiveness and diversity in its DNA. Due to the mastery of genetics and bioengineering, 
the Culture effectively has erased the boundaries of gender and race, either of which can 
be chosen and altered by its members at will. Gender chauvinism and racism are pri-
marily encountered in other more authoritarian societies, such as the empire of Azad in 
which a third gender ruthlessly dominates and exploits its male and female counterparts 
(Banks, 1989). Along with liberal freedoms comes a set of normative expectations, too: 
not only is a sex-change easy, one is also expected to have at least one in their lifetime; 
one is also expected to give birth to a child, which is only possible as a female. The male 
protagonist of The Player of Games, Gurgeh, is treated with suspicion for sticking to his 
birth sex and for not trying out homosexual relationships (28). While these normative 
expectations are not strongly enforced, they demonstrate that the lifestyle of the Culture 
not only promotes diversity on a societal level but also in its members, who are constantly 
encouraged by their fellow citizens to have diverse experiences and live life to the fullest. 
It can be argued that a specific genetic and bodily makeup is crucial for being a citizen 
of the Culture. Endowed with above-average intelligence, powerful drug-glands, the abil-
ity for self-repair, the capacity to change their sex and other aspects of their body at will 
(although this takes time), and practical immortality, the humanoids of the Culture are 
superhuman entities. Banks notices that with such a biological setup it is potentially easy 
to subjugate populations of less developed populations, which is why the Culture reserves 
the right to withdraw the birthright of a Culture citizen, if there is a danger of illiberal 
abuse (Banks, 1994). Such a bio-technical devolution is the equivalent to the withdrawal 
of citizenship. On the flip side, humanoids and other beings that decide to become citi-
zens of the Culture are entitled to a biological upgrade. The biological setup of Culture 
citizens, especially their improved sexual capacities and drug glands, make them the ob-
ject of admiration of other species, even though they may otherwise despise the Culture.
Not all citizens of the Culture are biological, though. While artificial intelligence of 
sub-human, human, or even superhuman levels exists in all developed civilizations of 
the Culture universe, the unique thing about the Culture is that it grants all “sentient 
machines”, as it prefers to call AIs, full citizenship status. The liberal principles of freedom 
and non-exploitation also apply to the sentient machines, which Banks renders plausible 
by the following argument (Ibid.):
No machine is exploited, either; the idea here being that any job can be automated 
in such a way as to ensure that it can be done by a machine well below the level 
of potential consciousness . . . Where intelligent supervision of a manufacturing 
or maintenance operation is required, the intellectual challenge involved (and the 
relative lightness of the effort required) would make such supervision rewarding 
and enjoyable, whether for human or machine.
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In other words, there is no exploitation of the sentient labor force in the Culture be-
cause every work requiring a certain level of sentience is intrinsically “rewarding and 
enjoyable” and thus “indistinguishable from play”, if not by all, at least by some Culture 
citizens. Given the trillions of inhabitants of the Culture, it is just a matter of logistics to 
find the right person, regardless of whether it is humanoid or a human-level “drone”, for a 
job that it will find “rewarding and enjoyable”, a task that the artificial-super-intelligences 
of the Culture, the god-like “minds”, seem to find “rewarding and enjoyable”. The minds 
not only operate the orbitals and spaceships of the Culture; they can also be described 
as its de-facto rulers. Horza, the main protagonist of Consider Phlebas, despises the Cul-
ture precisely for this reason: “I don’t care how self-righteous the Culture feels, or how 
many people the Idirans kill. They’re on the side of life—boring, old-fashioned, biologi-
cal life; smelly, fallible and short-sighted, God knows, but real life. You’re ruled by your 
machines. You’re an evolutionary dead end” (1987: 29).
It is the luddite fear and hatred of machines that replaces racism in the setting of the 
Culture. While many galactic civilizations are racial supremacists regarding their own 
species, what unites them against the Culture is their belief that machines should stay 
in their place and do as they are told. Thus, Banks not only offers a reflection on racism 
and inclusion in contemporary societies, but also a controversial contribution to ongoing 
debates on artificial intelligence which tend to portray autonomous AI as an existential 
threat. On January 12, 2015, Nick Bostrom, Stephen Hawking, Elon Musk, and others 
signed an open letter acknowledging the tremendous potential of artificial intelligence, 
but also cautioned that “our AI systems must do what we want them to do” (Future of Life 
Institute, 2020). This eerily echoes the conservative criticism of liberalism, which doubts 
the capacity of human beings to make free choices for their own good and the good of 
others. Such reasoning is an anathema for the Culture, which advocates freedom for all 
sentient matter.
Nowadays, many liberals are willing to extend rights to other living beings, but this 
usually stops at machines which need to be controlled. Those authors that otherwise re-
ject Hobbes’ dark anthropology of “homo homini lupus est” nonetheless subscribe to the 
statement “machina homini lupus est”. Banks’ literary thought experiment radicalizes the 
presuppositions of liberalism and envisions a solidarity between biological and mechani-
cal life: why shouldn’t it be possible for machines created in a liberal society to share the 
reasoning, emotions, and idealism of their fellow humanoid citizens? Banks questions the 
human impulse to dominate machines and appeals to our faith in liberalism, arguing that 
its principles will also appeal to sentient machines. It should be noted that the decision 
to empower and grant autonomy as well as citizenship to their machines is portrayed as 
the single most important reason behind the Culture becoming a superpower. This mir-
rors liberal arguments throughout the ages that the inclusion and empowerment of the 
masses provides a distinctive advantage to liberal societies.
In the post-scarcity society of the Culture, there is little room for tensions and clashes 
between the civil sphere and other spheres. The economic sphere of the market has been 
replaced by economic planning and an economy of gift-giving and voluntary work, which 
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is basically an extension of the civil logic to the material realm. Similarly, the Culture 
does not exist as a state, only as groups of individuals, each and no one representing the 
Culture as such. Culture citizens act according to their own reasoning and have to reach 
a consensus every time anew in what could be called political or legal matters. Other 
spheres mentioned by Alexander (2006), for example religion, race, and gender, play no 
role at all as these distinctions no longer serve as bases for social divisions.
Even the civil sphere of the Culture is only weakly institutionalized. There are com-
municative institutions, such as entertainment media and news services, as well as reg-
ulative institutions such as political offices and popular votes, but they operate on an 
informal basis and not as formal organizations. What is most striking is probably the 
absence of law. The Culture has no laws, only social conventions whose enforcement re-
lies on individual participation and public consensus every time. “The court of informed 
public opinion” (Banks, 2010: 155) is literally the highest authority. On contested mat-
ters, conflicts are resolved through voting. The principle of “one man, one vote” does not 
hold: greater weight is given to votes on the basis of sentience (which privileges the Cul-
ture minds) and concerned-ness (e.g., in human matters, human votes are given a larger 
weight). Most voting takes place at the local level, among the inhabitants of a specific 
community, ship or orbital; in the rare case of matters concerning the Culture as a whole, 
such as the declaration of the Idiran-Culture war, there is civilization-wide voting. While 
the outcome of the voting determines the collective course of action, it is individually 
non-binding. There is always the option to leave the community and even the Culture 
as such, which, for example, resulted in the split-off of the pacifist faction in the Idiran-
Culture War.
The Liberal Problem of Meaning
As a post-scarcity society, the Culture has overcome the Hobbesian state of nature where 
life was “nasty, brutish and short”. All material needs of Culture citizens are effortlessly 
satisfied, the labor they provide is “indistinguishable from play, or a hobby”, and they 
enjoy extended lifespans or even immortality. At the same time, the humanoids that cre-
ated the Culture are no longer really needed: they “are unnecessary for the running of the 
starships, and have a status somewhere between passengers, pets and parasites” (Banks, 
1994). In a society in which “the greatest happiness of all” has become a real possibility, 
the liberal problem of meaning addressed by Orwell moves to the foreground, on a per-
sonal as well as on a societal level. The following passage from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra 
offers a seemingly accurate portrayal of life in the Culture (2006: 10):
“What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?”—thus asks the 
last human being, blinking. Then the earth has become small, and on it hops the 
last human being, who makes everything small. His kind is ineradicable, like the 
flea beetle; the last human being lives longest. “We invented happiness”—say the 
last human beings, blinking. They abandoned the regions where it was hard to live: 
for one needs warmth. . . . A bit of poison once in a while; that makes for pleasant 
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dreams. And much poison at the end, for a pleasant death. One still works, for work 
is a form of entertainment. But one sees to it that the entertainment is not a strain. 
One no longer becomes poor and rich: both are too burdensome. Who wants to 
rule anymore? Who wants to obey anymore? Both are too burdensome.
While Culture citizens are biologically superhumans, they live the life of Nietzsche’s 
last man, as fleas in the fur of mighty spaceships and orbitals, tailored to and caring for 
their needs, enjoying drugs, entertainment, and a life without burden in an egalitarian 
society. It seems that the Culture as a society has not much to offer to its citizens in terms 
of meaning. In the “Notes on the Culture”, Banks states that “Philosophically, the Culture 
accepts, generally, that questions such as “What is the meaning of life?” are themselves 
meaningless” (Banks, 1994). In the end, the quest for meaning is delegated to the indi-
vidual: “we make our own meanings, whether we like it or not”.
The liberal problem of meaning as a personal issue is best reflected in The Player of 
Games (1989). The novel starts with Gurgeh, a dedicated player of all kinds of games, 
talking about what could be called his midlife-crisis with a befriended drone: “Everything 
seems gray at the moment, Chamlis. Sometimes I start to think I’m repeating myself, that 
even new games are old ones in disguise, and nothing’s worth playing for anyway” (22).
The problem of meaning contemplated in the Culture novels is not something com-
pletely foreign to members of today’s affluent societies but is exacerbated by the long lifes-
pan of Culture citizens and the fact that even extravagant material desires can be easily 
satisfied. What is the point of betting, Gurgeh asks, if you can have anything? In contrast, 
games outside of the Culture are often portrayed as barbaric and risky. An example is 
“Damage” (Banks, 1987), where players not only bet fortunes but also have to bring real 
“lives” to the table, that is, sentient creatures which are willing to die in their place; in the 
game of “Azad” (1989), which determines one’s place in an authoritarian society, bets of-
ten involve the amputation of limbs. The authoritarian societies portrayed in the Culture 
series are based on suffering and sacrifice, which Banks condemns but also recognizes 
as powerful sources of meaning. Chamlis, the drone conversing with Gurgeh, points out 
that his desires cannot be fulfilled within the liberalism of the Culture: “We’re well free 
of that. You want something you can’t have, Gurgeh. You enjoy your life in the Culture, 
but it can’t provide you with sufficient threats; the true gambler needs the excitement of 
potential loss, even ruin, to feel wholly alive” (22).
In the course of the novel, the hero embarks on a quest to beat the authoritarian Azad 
at their own game, played with high stakes, while simultaneously compensating for the 
lack of meaning in his life and advancing the goals of the Culture. Despite the entertain-
ment and distractions that perfect virtual environments can offer, there is a longing for 
the “real” in the Culture, even if it entails suffering or the risk of death. In Consider Phle-
bas, we meet the Culture citizen Fal who has a passion for unsupervised hiking trips, the 
last of which ended with her lying “in the snow with a shattered leg for a day and a night 
before a search party had discovered her” (1987: 88). In Look to Windward (2000), we 
52 RUSSIAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. 2020. VOL. 19. NO 4
see Culture citizens engaging in various dangerous activities and sports, not only risking 
their lives but doing so without recent digital backup. 9
At times, Banks seems to offer a critical portrayal of Culture citizens as easily bored 
thrill-seekers, which are willing to throw away their lives for a kick because nothing else 
matters. Nevertheless, without any doubt, he would have preferred to live in an affluent 
society where people can freely risk and even end their lives. We may not do without “tin 
soldiers” (cf. Orwell, 1940), but replacing involuntary suffering and war with dangerous 
sports and war games is definitely an improvement from a liberal perspective. Despite 
their otherwise comfortable lives, citizens of the Culture are not shallow hedonists, but 
value hardships, risks, and even sacrifices as sources of meaning for their personal life, 
as long as they are freely chosen and self-imposed. Other civilizations may regard these 
practices as the pinnacle of decadence, but the Culture views them as the embodiment of 
its sacred principles. 
The liberal problem of meaning has not only a private and personal but also a public 
and political dimension. According to Banks (1994), the education of Culture citizens 
raises awareness of the fact that its liberal achievements should not be taken for granted:
Part of their education, both initially and continually, comprises the understanding 
that beings less fortunate—though no less intellectually or morally worthy—than 
themselves have suffered and, elsewhere, are still suffering. For the Culture to con-
tinue without terminal decadence, the point needs to be made, regularly, that its 
easy hedonism is not some ground-state of nature, but something desirable, assidu-
ously worked for in the past, not necessarily easily attained, and requiring apprecia-
tion and maintenance both in the present and the future.
The seemingly care-free life of Culture citizens is based on the work of previous gen-
erations and requires the ongoing care of the Culture minds and all other Culture citi-
zens, which at least have to maintain their civility in everyday life. In order to endow their 
liberal utopia with strong meanings, the Culture relies on a liberal/authoritarian binary, 
on the remembrance of barbarisms in its own past and the recognition of the suffering of 
others in the present. For Alan Jacobs (2009: 49)—recalling the suffering of the innocent 
child in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov—the fact that Culture citizens seem to rely on 
the suffering of others to experience their lives as meaningful casts a dark shadow on the 
Culture. From a cultural sociological perspective, especially one informed by Durkheim’s 
theory of the sacred, this seems rather unavoidable: meanings arise only through distinc-
tions, and strong meanings emerge from emotionally charged oppositions. The strong 
meaning structure of the Culture, its sacred core, is the driving force behind its mission-
ary zeal, its open and hidden efforts to undermine authoritarian rule throughout the 
galaxy, and to liberate those suffering from it.
9. As we learn in Surface Detail (2010), the technology of “backing-up” the mind-state of a person does 
not reverse death: if I die, a digital copy of a previous mind state of mine will continue to exist, but is that copy 
actually me, whose stream of consciousness is upended by death?
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The war of the Culture against the Idirans, which is the immediate context of Consider 
Phlebas (Banks, 1987) with a fallout which runs like a thread throughout the whole series, 
is the paradigmatic exemplification of the Culture’s militant belief in the moral superior-
ity of liberalism. While the authoritarian Idirans are no direct threat for the Culture, non-
interference would have meant “the loss of its purpose and that clarity of conscience; the 
destruction of its spirit; the surrender of its soul” (452). Banks makes it clear that it was 
not the Idirans that had to fight this war, but the Culture, which “knew from the start” 
that this was “a religious war in the fullest sense” (451). Nevertheless, there are those who 
doubt, even within the Culture, that a liberal, anarchic, and hedonistic society such as 
the Culture can ever be fit for war. Not only do its adversaries mistake its lavish lifestyle 
for a sign of decadence and weakness, some of its citizens are also susceptible to such a 
flawed reasoning. In Consider Phlebas, a young boy lectures his fellow citizen Fal about 
the authoritarian virtues of the enemy: “‘I’m not so sure,’ he said, rubbing his chin. ‘I’m 
not sure we have the will’. ‘The will?’ Fal said. ‘Yes. The desire to fight. I think the Idirans 
are natural fighters. We aren’t. I mean, look at us . . .’ He smiled, as though he was much 
older and thought himself much wiser than she, and he turned his head and waved his 
hand lazily towards the island, where the boats lay tilted against the sand” (274).
Banks wants to make the point that authoritarianism is not intrinsically superior to 
liberalism, even in military matters, although initially it might prove difficult to mobilize 
an otherwise peaceful society into a full-scale war. After initial setbacks and withdrawals, 
the Culture is bound to win the war against the Idirans, thanks to the military might of 
their fully autonomous ships. For Banks, this victory is not just the result of technological 
superiority, but a triumph of the liberal order as such. The Culture was able to realize the 
technological potential of its ships to the fullest only by including machines as citizens 
and granting them full freedom and a sense of purpose. It is not hard to find parallels 
in human history: certainly, egalitarian societies and democratic governments have not 
been less successful at war than their illiberal counterparts. 
Nevertheless, the Culture had to pay a price for its victory. Those who refused to 
participate in the war, machines and humanoids alike, formed the pacifist faction which 
left the Culture altogether. Confronted with the suffering caused by the war, millions 
of Culture citizens protested by putting themselves in digital hibernation, “only to be 
revived once the Culture could statistically ‘prove’ the war had been morally justified” 
(465), which happens hundreds of years later, when the suffering that the war suppos-
edly prevented is considered to outweigh the suffering caused by it. Nevertheless, there is 
an insurmountable gap between the public meaning of the war and personal meanings, 
especially for its veterans. Balveda in Consider Phlebas (1987), a veteran of the war suffer-
ing from a trauma that she refuses to treat medically, is one of those revived but chooses 
to auto-euthanize several months later. The personal experience of war not only affects 
humanoids but also the sentient machines of the Culture. In Look to Windward (2000), 
the traumatized mind of a former warship that now runs a Culture orbital threatened by 
a terrorist attack voluntarily self-destructs. For Banks, suicide is an exit option that a truly 
liberal society needs to respect.
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Diabolic Politics and the Problem of Liberal Interventionism
The cultural structure of the Culture is characterized by a “religious” fervor to promote 
their own liberal values, occasionally through acts of warfare like the Idiran-Culture war 
in Consider Phlebas (1987), but mostly in the form of covert action which is, in one way or 
another, part of the plot of most Culture novels. It is a telling feature of the Culture that its 
society exhibits higher degrees of institutionalization in the boundary zones with other 
societies; it is as if contact with other societies confronts its liberal utopia with illiberal 
necessities of authority, elitism, and confidentiality. The necessity to interact with other 
civilizations led to the formation of the Contact section, a loose institutional network 
which serves as the diplomatic service and, if necessary, as the military arm of the Cul-
ture. Since its inception, it has spawned several independent subsections, most notori-
ously Special Circumstances (SC), Culture’s “euphemism for military intelligence” (238). 
While only a minuscule part of the Culture, SC plays an important role in most Culture 
novels, and is frequently used by Banks to reflect upon the dilemmas of liberal interven-
tion, and what I call, following Max Weber, the “diabolic” nature of politics.
In his “Politics as Vocation” (1949), based on a lecture delivered to the liberal Free 
Student Union in Munich on the 28th of January, 1919, Weber calls for an ethic of respon-
sibility (Verantwortungsethik) within the limits of realpolitik: “Also the early Christians 
knew full well the world is governed by demons and that he who lets himself in for poli-
tics, that is, for power and force as means, contracts with diabolical powers and for his 
action it is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that 
often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant” (123).
Weber rejects any “ethic of ultimate ends” (Gesinnungsethik), not only because it dis-
regards the consequences of action but also because it is ultimately non-sustainable in the 
real world. The political experiment of “radical pacifist sects” in North America which 
“renounced violence towards the outside” took, according to Weber, “a tragic course, in-
asmuch as with the outbreak of the War of Independence the Quakers could not stand up 
arms-in-hand for their ideals, which were those of the war” (1949: 124). Radical pacifism 
is ultimately self-defeating; it can only persist if pacifist communities are protected by a 
larger, more belligerent society. The same can be said about liberalism, which may not 
be spread or even sustained without occasionally violating liberal principles themselves. 
Rather surprisingly, the utopia of the Culture ultimately serves to highlight the diabolic 
realpolitik of liberalism.
The Contact section in general and SC in particular serve as institutional buffer-zones 
of moral and political ambiguity, which absorb the diabolic qualities of liberal politics 
so that the rest of the Culture can enjoy its clear conscience. As “the elite of the elite, in 
a society which abhor[s] elitism” (1987: 30), SC agents have an ambivalent reputation in 
the Culture, being dismissed as immoral but also envied for their exciting lives. In the 
Culture, SC represents the ambivalence of the liberal sacred, and their transgressive acts 
can be regarded as polluted and sacred at the same time (cf. Kurakin, 2015). While the 
Culture in general and SC in particular think of themselves as being on the right side, 
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they readily admit that there is no such thing as moral certainty. As the SC agent Zma in 
Use of Weapons confesses, “. . . in Special Circumstances we deal in the moral equivalent 
of black holes, where the normal laws—the rules of right and wrong that people imagine 
apply everywhere else in the universe—break down; beyond those metaphysical event 
horizons, there exist . . . special circumstances” (Banks, 1990: 284f.).
While this sounds like “a good excuse for bad behavior”, the agent adds: “at least we 
need an excuse; think how many people need none at all” (Ibid.: 285). What allows Banks 
to pose the liberal dilemma in ideal-typical purity is precisely the fact that the Culture is 
conceptualized as a post-scarcity society, which does not have any kind of material inter-
est in the rest of the galaxy. No mundane interests interfere with the politics of the sacred 
and the profane, although the chaotic nature of reality twists and warps even the most 
ideal intentions to unanticipated ends. According to Banks, the liberal order, even in 
its most utopian expression, is necessarily contradictory, or even incomplete. Normative 
orders such as morality contain within themselves a Gödelian paradox, which lies also at 
the core of the liberal dilemma regarding the use of torture at the beginning of the 21st 
century (Binder, 2014, 2016). The exclusive inclusion of SC is one way to deal with this 
paradox, keeping the subsection at the margins of the Culture where they cannot con-
taminate the clear conscience of most Culture citizens, who readily distance themselves 
from the deeds of SC agents in case one of their interventions fails. 
In the Culture’s liberal utopia, the conscience of the individual reigns supreme. Un-
able to avoid the Gödelian paradox of morality and the decisionism it entails, the Culture 
delegates moral decisions to individuals as the ultimate authority on these matters. Re-
gardless of the Culture’s efforts to justify wars and interventions, its citizens always have 
the option to dissent, join a separate faction, or leave the Culture entirely. Individuals 
also have the freedom to act as they seem fit, which includes the powerful minds of the 
Culture. No wonder that some of the sinister plots in the Culture novels are attributed to a 
conspiracy of “hawkish” minds which aim to shake things up—for the best of the Culture, 
of course. In his Culture novels, Banks tends to highlight ambivalent moral decisions and 
liberal interventions with catastrophic consequences. This does not mean, however, that 
he gave up on the Culture as a liberal utopia, nor does it mean that he opposes liberal 
interventions in principle. 10 It just means that Banks is no “political infant” (Weber, 1949: 
123), and neither is the Culture. It is in this sense that the Culture series can be read as a 
political Bildungsroman.
The Culture is not only a liberal society, but it is also a society that has demonstrated 
a capacity for learning: first, in the war against the Idirans and its fallout, and later, from 
its less-successful liberal interventions. In the last novel of the series, Hydrogen Sonata 
(2012), the Culture adopts a more cautious interventionist approach, which finds its sym-
bolic expression in the piece of fictional music that gave the book its title. Originally writ-
ten for a music instrument yet to be invented, the Hydrogen Sonata is incredibly difficult 
10. Banks and his wife allegedly ripped up their passports and send the pieces to Tony Blair out of protest 
against the British involvement in the Iraq war—a gesture that made it difficult for Banks to promote his novels 
abroad.
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to play and sounds rather unpleasant. Nevertheless, one of the protagonists of the novel 
commits herself to learning the instrument and the sonata, growing two additional limbs 
to be able to do so. Her struggle to master the tune not only depicts what near-immortal 
beings in a post-scarcity society might spend their time on, but also serves, according to 
Ivaylo R. Schmilev, as a metaphor for the Culture’s engagement with the real: 
The titular Hydrogen Sonata she slowly and painstakingly learns to play is a symbol 
of attachment to a limiting, painful, sometimes even torturing reality which nev-
ertheless brings rewards. . . . The Hydrogen Sonata is then—just like every one of 
Banks’ sf novels—not a tragedy, but a tribute to the unbroken engagement with the 
limitations of reality and to the triumphs of those who, under the direst of circum-
stances, persevere in this engagement (2016: 67f.).
Banks makes this point repeatedly in his Culture novels, which is rather ironic consider-
ing the fact that they belong to the genre of science fiction and to the genre of literary 
utopias, which are both genres under the—not entirely unfounded—hermeneutic sus-
picion of serving primarily the function of “wish-fulfillment”. Paradoxically, the liberal 
utopia of the Culture is used by Banks to reflect on liberal realpolitik, its aspirations and 
limitations.
Conclusion
Banks’ Culture series offers a liberal myth of a distant future that nonetheless strikes 
close to home. It is a literary myth that brings “the unconscious cultural structures that 
regulate society into the light of the mind” (Alexander, 2003: 3f.), and that uses the artis-
tic imagination of a writer to dissect the foundations and explore the implications of the 
liberal order, thus addressing the contemporary crisis as well as the eternal dilemmas of 
liberalism. We may not live in a liberal utopia, but the dilemmas that the Culture faces are 
our own. Even Banks’ reflections about living a meaningful life in a post-scarcity society 
are not so far away as it sometimes seems, at least for members of the affluent middle and 
upper classes of our societies. 
Some of his concerns might even become more relevant in the near future with the 
progress of artificial intelligence and emerging debates about Universal Basic Income 
(UBI). It is striking that the discourse about UBI shows the same cleavage between lib-
eral and authoritarian thinking which we find in Banks’ novels (and Orwell’s review of 
Mein Kampf). Leaving the technical questions concerning the economic feasibility of UBI 
aside, here we see another theater of a “culture war” in which conservatives (though some 
call themselves liberals or even socialists) claim that wage labor, which necessarily entails 
suffering, domination, and exploitation, is indispensable for a meaningful life—not for 
all people, of course, and the critics of UBI usually exclude themselves, but surely for the 
masses. This eerily mirrors antique discourses on slavery, according to which some hu-
mans are simply unfit to cope with the freedom that is the prerequisite of being a citizen. 
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Arguments like this—and the doublethink accompanying them—show up frequently 
among the representatives of authoritarian societies in the Culture novels: the Azad em-
pire enforces strict hierarchies and norms for the good of the “common people”, while its 
ruling elite enjoys transgressing them (Banks, 1989); Paluvean conservatives instill the 
fear of artificial hells, which exist in (virtual) reality, in their people to keep them in line 
(2010). Fear, pain, and sacrifice may be necessary to sustain an authoritarian order, but 
they are an anathema to the liberal order. As a self-conscious liberal, Banks rejects such 
arguments and the dark anthropology they entail. Instead, liberals need to put faith in 
their fellow citizens and the future.
Liberals and authoritarians indeed have different anthropologies. While both are cen-
tered on meaning, they differ in their structures of meaning. Liberals engage in a “dis-
course of liberty” while authoritarians favor a “discourse of repression” (cf. Alexander, 
2006). Authoritarians stress the importance of domination, suffering, and sacrifice, while 
liberals promote freedom. Liberals do not deny that suffering and sacrifice are important 
sources of meaning but consider them only permissible if they are the result of an exer-
cise of freedom. Nevertheless, as Banks demonstrates in his Culture series, the reality of 
politics and morality does not always match these neat binaries. As liberals, we have to 
accept the fact that politics is diabolic. Alexander argues: “We need narratives if we are 
to make progress and experience tragedy” (2003: 4); Banks’ Culture novels suggest that 
progress and tragedy are inextricably linked.
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Либеральный порядок за пределами Земли? Гражданская 
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Начиная с либеральной проблемы смысла Джорджа Оруэлла, эта статья исследует 
либерализм как культурную структуру и миф, опираясь на теорию гражданской сферы 
Джеффри К. Александера и научно-фантастические романы Иэна М. Бэнкса. Вслед за 
Александером утверждается, что либеральные общества строятся вокруг сакрального 
ядра, описываемого культурными структурами гражданской сферы. Они же являются 
структурами смысла и чувства. Гражданские дискурсы и движения в либеральных (и не очень 
либеральных) обществах мобилизуют мощные символы сакрального и профанного и, таким 
образом, способны внушать почти религиозную преданность. Далее в статье исследуется 
смысловая структура, культурные противоречия и возможное будущее либерального 
порядка на основе обсуждения серии «Культура» Иэна Бэнкса. Действие этих романов 
происходит в границах «Культуры» — галактической цивилизации и либеральной утопии. 
Именно в этой утопической среде Бэнкс исследует внутренние дилеммы либерализма, 
например, между пацифизмом и интервенционизмом, обращаясь и к актуальным вопросам, 
таким как либеральная проблема смысла, очарование авторитаризмом или социальный 
статус искусственного интеллекта. С помощью литературного воображения писатели-
фантасты конструируют «миф будущего» (Бэнкс), который зачастую соответствует мифам 
современности, но также — как в случае Бэнкса — переосмысляет их, их противоречия 
и последствия. Наконец, воображаемые вариации социального порядка в научной 
фантастике могут быть ценным источником для воображения социологов, рассматривающих 
саму возможность социального порядка.
Ключевые слова: социология культуры, гражданская сфера, либерализм, авторитаризм, 
научная фантастика, «культура», Джеффри К. Александер, Иэн М. Бэнкс
